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As numbers of agricultural cooperatives and memberships decline it is natural to question whether 
cooperatives are as competitive as other forms of agribusiness (Kraenzle et al.).  A recent survey by 
Keeling (2004) finds that seventy-percent of respondents believed cooperative businesses were not as 
well managed as other agribusiness types.  A slight majority (54%) of survey respondents also felt 
that co-ops were generally less successful than other agribusinesses.    
Observed changes in the marketplace support the implication that cooperatives are indeed 
struggling.  Inter-cooperative coordination costs have risen as members have become increasingly 
heterogeneous and cooperative opportunities and threats from abroad have grown as barriers to trade 
have declined.  Not surprisingly, the role of managers and boards of directors in developing and 
pursuing competitive business plans has increased in complexity.  
  Some researchers suggest that it is not solely changes in the competitive environment that 
cause cooperatives stress but rather the nature of the traditional structure of cooperatives that limits 
their ability to adapt and survive in a volatile global marketplace.  Specifically, Cook and Iliopoulos 
report that vaguely defined property rights are responsible for free-rider, horizon, portfolio, control, 
and influence problems.  Cross and Buccola find that as markets become more competitive, traditional 
cooperative structures encourage lower investment and higher probability of bankruptcy than does an 
IOF.  Keeling (2005) finds that board size may affect cooperative performance and that farm supply 
co-ops, in particular, are prone to having detrimentally large boards. 
In this chapter, a complementary explanation for the struggles and failures of traditional 
cooperatives is developed.  In particular, I explore a situation in which a partial-buyer cooperative and a 
monopsonistic IOF share a commodity market.  An exogenous shock occurs that increases both firms’   3
processing costs.  Cooperative processing costs may further increase if members leave the cooperative 
(Sexton).   The first member to leave the cooperative will be that for whom the benefits from 
cooperative membership are less than from available alternatives and the perceived cost of processing 
his raw product is the lowest relative to other cooperative members (Sexton).  As members leave the co-
op, the firm’s economies of size advantage decreases and additional members will find it more 
beneficial to leave the cooperative to seek out alternative processing arrangements.   
The situation described above is analogous to a bank run but can also be described as a 
cooperative “death spiral” in which declining membership and increasing costs ultimately force a 
cooperative to close.  The eventual failure of the cooperative may take several periods as members of 
the heterogeneous group of cooperators leave at different times.  Circumstances surrounding the 
closure of the Rice Growers Association of California (RGA) closely resemble those described above.  
In particular, RGA’s former managers witnessed the firm’s largest growers (low cost producers) leave 
first and the smallest growers, representing roughly 5% of the total California volume, remaining until 
the cooperative closed. 
The present investigation into cooperative growth and decline takes place in the context of a 
multi-period cooperative game, a potential improvement over static cooperative models.  An agent’s 
choice is modeled to be a function of an alternative investment opportunity, choices made by other 
agents who are faced with an identical set of possible strategies, and exogenous shocks that affect 
cooperative performance.  Payoffs from cooperation will be modeled as functions of the number of 
members in the cooperative.  Once an agent has made the decision to remain at the cooperative, the 
agent may re-evaluate alternatives in each period.   The result is a multi-period repeated game in which 
the growth or decline of a cooperative is determined.   4
The proceeding pages begin with a discussion of various conditions for club and cooperative 
formation/dissolution.  Next, a general methodological framework in which to study cooperative 
decline resulting from an exogenous shock is developed.   After that, the post-shock environment is 
described.  Finally, this chapter concludes with a summary of the research findings and discussion of 
potential applications. 
  
Literature Review  
Studies of cooperative formation and failure can trace their roots to pioneering investigations in club 
theory. Justifications for club formation have been based on a number of rationales; however, Tiebout 
and Wiseman were the first to investigate economies of scale as the primary basis for club creation.  
This rationale is frequently used to justify the existence of both marketing and farm supply type 
cooperatives.  Similar to Tiebout and Wiseman, Olsen recognized that clubs would form to take 
advantage of scale economies but also distinguished between inclusive and exclusive clubs.  These types 
of clubs are similar to the open and closed cooperatives that currently characterize the agribusiness 
environment.  Cost reductions from team production and scale economies were also investigated by 
McGuire. 
  Game theory has assisted in the advancement of club and cooperative theory by aiding in the 
determination of optimal numbers of clubs, membership size, and organizational stability.  John von 
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern developed the concept of an n-person game, with respect to game 
theory, a population of size n is comprised of potential members and non-members for whom there are 
numbers of possible club formations. Within the game-theory framework, the concept of the core was 
developed.  The core solution implies that “no individual or set of individuals can improve upon their   5
situation by forming a different partition (club)” (Sandler and Tschirhart).   When the entire population 
is in the club, the core is stable and Pareto optimal as no individual or set of members will have an 
incentive to leave.  This characterization of the solution evokes super-additivity of the benefit function 
which implies that clubs will only form when benefits from membership are strictly greater than the sum 
of benefits that would accrue to members if they acted individually (Pauly 1967).  
  The concept of the core as an equilibrium cooperative solution is explored in Sexton.  This game 
theoretic investigation into cooperative formation reveals that members or potential members may have 
incentives to form or leave a cooperative based on assumptions about the nature of pricing schemes the 
cooperative employs.  Members will remain in the cooperative so long as benefits from membership 
outweigh benefits from alternative investment opportunities.  Similarly, Staatz finds that for 
cooperatives to attain stability and not induce member defections, the cost allocated to the cooperative 
group must be less than or equal to the cost that any subgroup of the cooperative can guarantee itself.  
This implies that a cooperative’s membership base is stable so long as each agent finds it more 
beneficial to be a member of the existing cooperative than to create a new cooperative out of a subgroup 
of members or seek alternative investment opportunities.  An important finding from the above literature 
is that agent’s choices are interrelated, i.e. a member’s choice to leave or join a cooperative affects other 
agents’ choices to leave or join.  It remains, however, to analyze cooperative change as a function of 
agent choice in a multi-period framework. 
  The bank run literature offers insight into the set up of a multi-period game. In particular, this 
literature has examined the multiple equilibria that may be attained as a result of potential and current 
members (investors) actions.  Diamond and Dybvig demonstrate that agents playing a multi-period game 
may be influenced by an exogenous random variable such as stock market performance.  In the case of   6
cooperatives, an exogenous random variable may influence firm performance leading to lower (higher) 
grower returns that result in membership defections (increases) and cooperative decline (growth). 
Postlewaite and Vivies build on Diamond and Dybvig’s model but argue that a unique 
equilibrium may be reached.  In their model, an agent’s choice to withdraw funds from a bank is based 
not on the need to consume, but rather on self-interest and is modeled as a Prisoner’s Dilemma.  Similar 
to other models, each agent’s strategy is a best response to his conjecture about the behavior of the other 
agent and payoffs from each strategy are known with certainty.   
 
The Mathematical Model 
Following Sexton and Sexton, the inquiry begins in a market environment in which an incumbent 
monopsonist has allowed the entry of a cooperative competitor. Due to market stratification, the IOF is 
able to continue acting as a monopsonist after the partial-supplier cooperative has been formed.  Thus 
the IOF will max profits according to the following equation: 
(, ) IOF i IOF IOF
i
Pq Q C Q η ψ Π= ( ) ∗ − ∑    (1) 
In (1) above,  i
i
Pq η () ∑  is price the IOF receives for the processed product,  (1 ) IOF i i
i
Qq α =− ∑  is the 
sum of producer deliveries the IOF,  i
i
q η∑  represents the total amount of processed product in the out 
put market which is fully supplied by the IOF and the co-op,  ( , ) IOF CQ ψ  is the costs to the IOF to create 
the processed product, andψ  represents firm fixed costs of production.  Using the above profit max 


































 represents marginal cost.   
Both the co-op and the IOF have market power in the processed good or output market.  Any 
profits the co-op realizes from selling the processed good are returned to the co-op membership in the 
form of patronage dividends that are given in proportion to each member’s use of the cooperative.  The 
cooperative maximizes profits according to the following objective function: 
() *( ) *( ) , c o o p i i ii i ii i ii
i
P q qQ r qQ C qQ η −− −
⎛⎞
Π = α+ − α+ −α+ β ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑    (3) 
Where *( ) ii i rq Q − α+ the cash price is paid to the cooperative’s members upon delivery of their product 
to the cooperative,  () , ii i Cq Q − α+ β  is the cooperatives cost to produce the processed product, and β 
represents co-op fixed costs of production.  The cooperative practices open membership and is unable to 
choose deliveries such that they equal the profit maximizing level.  It is possible that by chance 
deliveries are expected to be optimal and this has some implications for produceri’s distribution choice.   
Every cooperative member has the choice to supply the IOF or the cooperative or distribute his 
production between the two.  Non-member producers may only supply the IOF.  All producers grow a 
homogeneous product though producers themselves are heterogeneous and have different cost functions. 
The farmer’s profit max equation appears below: 
( ) ( ) *1 f ( , , ) * ( ) . . 0 1 iI O F i i i i i i i c o o p i i Pq r q q Q c q s t − Π= − α + ∗ α + α Π − ≤ α≤      (4)   8




=α ∑  is farmer i’s expectation on the sum of deliveries to the cooperative less farmer i’s 
delivery to the co-op,  i α  represents the proportion of farmer i’s total production that is delivered to the 
cooperative and 1- i α is thus the proportion of farmer i’s total production that is delivered to the IOF.   
The per unit delivery price paid to the farmer by the co-op isr , while the IOF will pay  IOF P  per each 
until farmer i delivers.  The producer does not have bargaining power with the IOF and acts as a price 
taker.  In addition, when farmer i supplies the cooperative, he will also receive a share of cooperative 
profits in proportion to his deliveries.  Farmer i’s share of co-op profits is a represented by the function 













 which is increasing in i α and  i q  decreasing in i Q− .  Both the cooperative and 





⎝⎠ ∑  is the price the cooperative and IOF receive 
for selling a unit of processed product in the output market and is function of total production i
i
q ∑  
multiplied by a transformation parameter that indicates the efficiency with which inputs are processed 





⎝⎠ ∑ , is a function of input deliveries to the IOF, and to the co-
op.  Once the Kuhn-Tucker constraints are added, the farmer’s profit max function becomes the 
following constrained optimization problem:   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) *1  f ( , , ) ( ) 1 iI O F i i i i i i i c o o p i i i LP qr q q Q c q λδ − =− α + ∗ α + α Π − + − α − α  (5) 
Due to the bounded non-negativity constraints we have cases:  
Table 1: Complementary Slackness Conditions 
λ=0, δ=0  (1-αi)>0, αi >0  Interior Solution, Both 
Co-op and IOF Deliveries 
0<αi<1   9
λ>0, δ=0  (1-αi)=0, αi >0  Corner Solution, No 
IOF Deliveries 
αi =1 
λ>0, δ>0  (1-αi)>0, αi =0  Corner Solution, No Cooperative Deliveries  αi =0 
λ=0, δ>0  (1-αi)>0, αi =0  Non-rational  
 
These complementary slackness conditions correspond to situations in which the marginal benefit from 
cooperating can be equated with the marginal benefit from supplying the IOF for some value of i α , 
when the marginal benefit from cooperating is larger than supplying the IOF for every value of  i α less 
than one, and finally when the marginal benefit from cooperating is less than supplying the IOF for 
every value of i α .  In the proceeding sections produceri’s distribution decisions are analyzed in the 
context of these three cases. 
 The profit maximizing farmer will have two decision rules.  The first decision is to choose the 
level of quantity produced, i q  such that profit is maximized. The producer’s profit maximizing level of 
production is determined by setting the first derivative of the profit function with respect to  i q such that 
it is equal to zero.  The following is the first characteristic equation. 
f( , , ) ( )
(1 ) f( , , )* * 0
coop i ii i i







∂Π ⎡⎤ ∂Π ∂ α ∂
=− α + α + α + Π − = ⎢⎥ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ⎣⎦
 (6) 
This characteristic equation above sets the marginal cost of production equal to marginal revenue earned 
from supplying both the IOF and cooperative.   
  The farmer has an additional choice variable to determine, i α  the proportion of production 
farmer i will deliver to the co-op, hence there will be a second characteristic equation.  The first step to 
determining the equation is to take the derivative of farmer i’s profit function with respect to i α .  Since   10
the farmer is optimizing, this will set the marginal benefit from cooperation less the marginal benefit of 
delivering to the IOF, equal to zero, this is the second characteristic equation. 
f( , , )
f( , , )* * 0
coop ii i i
IOF i i i i i coop
ii i
qQ
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   (7) 
In the above equation, the IOF term is negative to indicate that there is a marginal opportunity cost 
associated with increasing the proportion of farmer i’s deliveries to the cooperative.  In the case of an 
interior solution, where farmer i divides his production between the IOF and cooperative,  , λ δ , are equal 
to zero and drop out of the characteristic equation.  The derivative terms can then be re-arranged as 
follows:  
f( , , )
f( , , )* *
coop ii i
IOF i i i i i coop
ii
qQ





=+ α + Π ⎢⎥ ∂∂ ⎣⎦
      ( 8 )  
,, i IOF i COOP MB MB =            ( 9 )  
The relationship where farmer i equates the marginal benefit of supplying the IOF and cooperative is 
represented graphically in the figure below. 
Each farmer determines the optimal 
distribution of his production between 
the IOF and the cooperative by 
setting marginal benefit from 
supplying both equal to zero.  Solving 
for αi
* allows the producer to 
determine (1- αi
*)qi and αi
*qi , the 
optimal distribution of production   11
between the IOF and cooperative respectively.     
In order to determine the mathematical nature of the relationship between αi
 and qi, 
produceri’s endogenously determined choice variables, and  i Q− , the amount of production 
delivered to the cooperative by other producers, it is necessary to use the implicit function 







, the primary comparative static 
of interest.  This comparative statistic will help to understand how individual producer’s 
decisions to allocate production to the cooperative are affected by the level of other producers’ 
deliveries.  After setting up the farmer’s profit max equation and taking the derivative of the 
equation with respect to i α  and  i q , the next step in signing the comparative statistic is to take 
derivatives of the characteristic equations with respect to choice variables  i α  and  i q .  
Represented in general form below is the Jacobian matrix containing the first derivatives of the 
two characteristic equations.  These derivatives are actually a matrix of second derivatives of 
produceri’s profit equation. 









































 Element  11 a  describes the change in produceri’s marginal revenue from cooperating less the 
change in marginal costs of production all with respect to a change in quantity produced.  The derivative   12
of cooperative profit with respect to  i q and  i α , element  21 a , describes how marginal revenue from 
supplying the cooperative and IOF will change with respect to a change in the proportion of production 
that produceri distributes to the cooperative.  The change in marginal revenue associated with the IOF is 
negative, indicating that this is a change in marginal opportunity cost. Applying Young’s theorem to the 
mixed cross-partial derivatives in this problem implies that element α12 is equivalent to element α21.  
This convenient result ensures that these derivatives are of the same value and sign although they are 
different derivatives from different functions.  Element  22 a  gives an expression for the change in 
marginal benefit from cooperating with respect to a change in the proportion of farmer i’s production 
that is delivered to the cooperative.  Benefits from cooperating depend on cooperative profitability 
which in turn depends upon the level of supply delivered to the cooperative.  If there is too much or too 
little supply, the cooperative may not be profitable and may provide fewer financial benefits to 
individual producers than could be accrued through delivering to the IOF.  The influence of produceri’s 
delivery decision on the cooperative’s profitability is in question and results in cases under which the 
signs of the above equations may vary.   







, it is also 
necessary to sign the derivative of each characteristic equation with respect to i Q− , the expected amount 
of other producer’s deliveries to the cooperative.  Because cooperative profits may be affected positively 
or negatively by the size of i Q− , the sign on these expressions will again depend upon assumptions made 
about the level of total deliveries made to the cooperative relative to the optimal level of input. 
The derivative of equation (6) with respect to  i Q−  describes the change in marginal revenue from 
cooperating with respect to changes in the expected deliveries of other producers to the co-op.  There is   13
no change in the marginal revenue derived from supplying the IOF when  i Q−  increases or decreases.  
The change in marginal benefit to produceri from cooperating with respect to  i Q−  is evaluated as 
derivative of equation (7) with respect to i Q− .  For both derivatives, the impact of a change in  i Q−  on 
cooperative profits and the producer’s share of these profits will determine the rate of change in 
marginal revenue and marginal benefit for the individual producer. 
In order to determine how produceri’s allocation of production changes when deliveries of other 
cooperators changes, each element of the Jacobian in addition to two mixed-partial derivatives taken 
with respect to  i Q−  are signed under a variety of circumstances.  Next, to determine the sign on the 
comparative statistic of interest, Cramer’s Rule is used to divide the determinant of the modified 
Jacobian, in which the negative of the mixed partial derivatives with respect to  i Q−  are substituted into 




































p           ( 1 0 )  
Each element of the above partial and mixed-partial derivatives is signed, however, the sign on the 
derivative will vary based on assumptions about cooperative deliveries relative to the profit maximizing 
level, the size of patronage revenue relative to the delivery price, and in particular, the relative marginal 
benefits from supplying the cooperative versus the IOF.  In the section below, the comparative statistic 
of interest is analyzed under different relative marginal benefit scenarios. I will first focus on the   14
situation in which  0 i α = , the second will look at when the producer distributes his production between 
the IOF and co-op and 0 1 i α pp , and the final scenario will cover the situation when the optimal 
decision is to fully supply the cooperative and  1 i α = . 
 
Case 1:  ,, ,0 , 0 iI O F iC O O P i i MB MB α α ∀= ff  
In this case, the marginal benefit from supplying the IOF outweighs the benefits for supplying the 
cooperative at every allocation of the producer’s crop.  This does not necessarily mean that cooperative 
profits are negative, simply that the combination of marginal benefits accruing to the producer from 
delivering to the cooperative plus the marginal benefits stemming from the patronage allocation are 
smaller than the benefits that can be derived from distributing solely to the IOF.   
When cooperative profits are negative there are two circumstances in which  0 i α = .  For 
example, if a loss is passed onto the producer and his share of the loss is greater than the revenue earned 
from his initial delivery to the cooperative, revenue from supplying the cooperative will be negative.  
Certainly, if the cooperative is passing on losses to producers that offset the positive initial delivery 
payment, no producer will supply the cooperative as doing so will incur a loss.   
Another situation may arise when the producer’s initial co-op delivery payment is sufficient to 
offset the producer’s share of cooperative losses.  Even if total benefits from cooperating are positive, 
though likely small, the producer may still have no incentive to supply the co-op as the marginal benefit 
from supplying the IOF may dominate marginal 
benefits from cooperating for every positive value 
of  i α .  When cooperative profits are negative but   15
total benefits from cooperating are positive, the producer may have an incentive to partially supply the 
cooperative.  This situation is similar to one observed at the Rice Grower’s Association cooperative in 
1985.  When the cooperative issued bills to members instead of an expected progress payment, the 
following year many producer’s reduced their deliveries to the cooperative or simply terminated their 
membership.  Those that fully or partially supplied the co-op did so because the marginal benefits at 
their chosen level of patronage were equivalent to the perceived marginal benefits from supplying 
alternative organizations.  This situation is described in more detail in the next section. 
No deliveries to the co-op may be observed even when cooperative profit is positive.  In this case 
the producer would earn positive revenues from the co-op delivery payment and from his patronage 
refund (share of the positive cooperative profits).  However, the producer does not supply the 
cooperative as marginal benefits from supplying the IOF are larger for every allocation of his 
production. This situation is represented graphically at left. 
In all three of these cases in which 0 i α = , the effect of an increase in expected cooperative 
deliveries by other producers, i Q− , will depend upon the value of relaxing the Kuhn-Tucker non-
negativity constraint, λ.  When benefits from cooperating increase with additional expected supply, an 
allocation of produceri’s production to the co-op may exist such that  , iI O F MB  can be equated with 







f .  
However, if the benefit of relaxing the Kuhn-Tucker constraint is zero or negative and does not increase 
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Case 2:  ,, ,0 1 i IOF i COOP i MB MB α = pp  
This is perhaps the most interesting case as there are numerous situations in which the producer will 
choose to distribute his production between both the IOF and co-op.  This case is also perhaps the most 
complex as there are a number of scenarios in which the producer’s allocation to the cooperative could 
increase or decrease as a result of changes in expected deliveries to the cooperative.  The producer’s 
decision to allocate more of less of his production to the cooperative is dictated by the need to equate the 
marginal benefit from supplying the cooperative with the marginal benefit of supplying the cooperative.  
The marginal benefit accruing to the producer from delivering to the IOF is know with certainty, 
however, the marginal benefits from delivering to the cooperative will depend on profitability and the 
producer’s share of profits (or losses).   
The cooperative operates under the traditional principle of open membership and unlimited 
member deliveries, as such the cooperative has little 
control over the amount of inputs it will receive and 
then process into products to be sold in the output 
market.  Depending on patronage levels, the 
cooperative may be operating at different 
profitability levels.  When cooperative deliveries are 
less than optimal, MRco-op<MCco-op, increasing  i Q−  
will boost cooperative profits (or reduce losses).    17
The figure above represents the case when marginal benefits from cooperating grow (or become 
positive) when  i Q−  and when the marginal benefits from supplying the IOF and co-op are equitable, a 







f .   
Due to the concavity of the cooperative profit function, increases in  i Q−  that result in input 
supply that is above optimal will lead to decreases in co-operative profits.  If the co-op was very close to 
having an optimal level of inputs and only a small increase in supply results from a change in  i Q− then 
the effect on profitability may be quite small and serve only to slightly reduce produceri’s marginal 







p .   
Because the cooperative profit function is concave in total deliveries, it is known that additional 
deliveries beyond the optimal level will decrease profits at an increasing rate.  As such, if an increase in 
i Q−  occurs when deliveries were already projected to be significantly above optimal, expected profits 
will decrease by more than when delivery levels are close to the profit maximizing level. Furthermore, 
produceri’s relative share of profits will 
decrease, assuming profits are positive this 
further reduces benefits from cooperating and 
decreases the individual producer’s profit 








p .  Both situations in which 
produceri’s allocation of production decreases   18
with increased supply to the co-op are represented in the figure at right. 
 
Case 3:  ,, ,1 1 iI O F iC O O P i i MB MB α α ∀= pp  
In this case, the marginal benefit from supplying the co-op outweighs benefits from supplying the IOF at 
every allocation of the producer’s crop (see figure at right).  This does not necessarily mean that 
cooperative profits are positive, simply that the 
combination of marginal benefits accruing to the 
producer from delivering to the cooperative plus 
the marginal benefits stemming from the 
patronage allocation are greater than the benefits 
that can be derived from distributing through the 
IOF.   
The corner solution when  1 i α =  may be 
maintained when  i Q−  rises under a variety of circumstances.  In particular, if the cooperative is 
operating where MRco-op<MCco-op, increasing  i Q−  will boost cooperative profits.  Even when the 
producer’s share of profits is relatively smaller than before, benefits from cooperating are likely to 
increase.  Since revenue generated from supplying the IOF is not affected by  i Q− .  The relative marginal 
benefit from supply the IOF will decrease and the cooperator will have no incentive to alter his 









If the cooperative was initially maximizing total profits and then  i Q−  increased, cooperative 
profits will decline slightly.  However, even if the producer’s marginal benefit from cooperative also   19
decline, so long as it is greater than the marginal benefit from supplying the IOF, no redistribution of 








.   On the other hand, if the increase in  i Q−  alters co-op profits 
to such a degree that the marginal benefit’s from co-op’ing are reduced and can be equated with the 








p .  Investigating the 
complementary slackness conditions will assist with determining the benefit to the cooperator of 
decreasing  i α .  When  1 i α = ,  0 δ = , if the benefit of relaxing this constraint is large, then for increases 
in  i Q− , it is more likely that the producer will reduce his allocation to the cooperative.  However, if the 
benefit of relaxing the constraint is zero or negative, not change in allocation will occur and the producer 
will continue to deliver all of his production to the cooperative.  
 
4.4 Conclusions 
Evidence from recent cooperative failures suggests that members’ base delivery 
decisions, in part, upon their expectation of deliveries that will be made by fellow cooperative 
members.  The exercise above is intended to demonstrate, that this determination is complex and 
dependent upon a variety of factors, but most importantly, it is dependent upon the individual 
producer’s expectation of cooperative profit and the relative marginal benefits from supplying 
the cooperative versus an IOF.  Under different circumstances, increased deliveries to the 
cooperative will result in decreased (increased) patronage or no change at all.   
Cooperatives depend upon the notion of economies of scale to reduce processing costs 
and increase benefits to members.  However, as shown in the above examples, cooperatives may   20
illicit “too much of a good thing”.  As supply increases beyond the profit-maximizing optimal 
level, benefits from cooperative membership decline and producers will shift increasing amounts 
of production towards supplying competitors.  If supply is expected to increase significantly 
above the optimal level, such that the marginal benefit from cooperating is small relative to 
marginal benefits from supplying the IOF, or possibly even negative, it may become irrational 
for producers to supply the cooperative at all.  
The opposite extreme exists where initial cooperative supply is below optimal levels.  
Even when profits increase (or losses decrease) with the addition of more supply, marginal 
benefits may not increase enough that producer’s are enticed to supply the cooperative. If 
producer believe that others will chose to allocate production in a similar manner, overall supply 
to the cooperative may decline in the next period and diseconomies of scale may eventually force 
the cooperative to close.   
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Appendix 
The equations below correspond to elements in the Jacobian matrix detailed in the mathematical 
model.  Signs of the derivatives will depend upon cooperative profitability, changes in share of 
cooperative profits, relative size of benefits fro supplying the cooperative relative to the IOF, and 
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